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1. Introduction  
 
Europe, like much of the advanced economy world, is facing a fundamental growth 
challenge. Growth has slowed down in the wake of the global financial crisis, as investment 
has come down, and the legacy of non-performing loans and uncertainty about the 
institutional arrangements established in response to the crisis is likely to be with us for 
years. However, the evidence suggests that this slowdown started before the crisis as 
improvements in productivity did not come at the same pace as in the past (Gordon, 2016; 
and IMF, 2015). Demographics, particularly the rapid aging of Europe with reduced 
participation and smaller working populations, has also played its part. Moreover, the data 
shows that human capital, the quality of labour input, is not improving as quickly as before. 
Taken together all these trends suggest a rather bleak future for European growth. 
 
This short article asks what industrial policy at the national and the EU level can do to 
increase growth in Europe. It does so from the perspective that long term growth is 
determined by innovation – either through imitation and adaptation, or genuine invention, 
of new products, processes or forms of organisation. Drawing on the Neo-Schumpeterian 
framework pioneered by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and further developed in a series of 
contributions (see, for example, Aghion et al., 2006). Figure X depicting the competitiveness 
of European regions suggests that there are two parts to the answer: (i) the advanced 
economies in Europe at the world technology frontier have to become better at promoting 
genuine invention and doing so under the constraints of environmental and social 
sustainability; and (ii) the economies in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in much of 
Southern Europe have to catch-up with the advanced economies, largely through imitation, 
adaptation and simple transfer of technologies, but also prepare themselves for the rapid 
pace of technological change at the frontier and increasingly binding environmental and 
social constraints. Achieving these two objectives will require a transformation of both 
economic structures and the supporting institutions at the European level as well as in 
individual countries. Importantly, regions within countries differ greatly and would be best 
served by different policies. This in turn will place high demand on state capacity as the 
policies needed will often meet with resistance and easily be captured by special interests, 
at the European, national and regional levels.  
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All this has to be achieved in a context where the pattern of globalisation is changing. As 
Baldwin (2016) points out, globalisation now increasingly involves massive amounts of 
advanced economy knowhow being shared with a small number of emerging economies 
through value chains tightly controlled by corporations. In such a world with fragmented 
and easily mobile production advanced economies should focus on “sticky” production 
factors and positive spillovers that the private sector ignores. Government policy should 
move from emphasising industry to service-sector jobs related to industry and promote the 
development of cities as they attract those kind of jobs and capture spillovers across value 
chains. In emerging economies the fragmentation of production reduce entry barriers – a 
country now only needs to become competitive in one part of the value chain, and not the 
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entire chain. The key objective for governments in these countries is to capture the 
knowledge spillovers and convert them into productivity improvements in other parts of the 
economy. In both sets of countries social policies are needed to deal with the consequences 
of structural transformation.   
 
The core conclusion is that relying solely on national industrial policies is not desirable as 
there are important cross-country spillovers, e.g., in the area of human capital investment, 
that undermine the incentives of national governments to invest. Yet, while the EU in many 
ways would be the optimal locus from this perspective, and can point to considerable 
achievements in the pooling of R&D resources, European institutions might not be strong 
enough to meaningfully support more ambitious policies. In particular, “entrepreneurial 
state” policies require a level of intervention that is hard to imagine in the current context. 
Those economies that were further away from the frontier, particularly those in Central and 
Eastern Europe, benefitted from the “outside anchor” EU provided in the accession process, 
but once they became full members EU enforcement powers have weakened substantially. 
Fortunately, most of these countries have now made the transition from middle to high 
income status, thus creating greater cohesion around industrial policy objectives. 
 
2. Neo-Schumpeterian industrial policy  
 
The core assumptions of the Neo-Schumpeterian framework are that long-term growth are 
that (i) long-run growth is driven by innovation; (ii) innovations result from entrepreneurial 
activities; and (iii) creative destruction, i.e., new innovations displacing old technologies, is 
critical (Aghion et al., 2016). An economy can be off the frontier in three different ways: (i) 
the aggregate of all industries and individual firms in these industries; (ii) the industry 
average and median; and (iii) each individual firm has its own (average) distance(s) to the 
frontier(s) in the industries in which it operates. Obviously (i) combines (ii) and (iii), but it 
also requires an assessment of the relative importance of individual sectors to the overall 
economy. (iii) is particularly important in understanding emerging and developing 
economies where hetereogeneity is particularly striking and where technologically advanced 
firms, and many emerging economies at least have a few such firms (Freund, 2016), can 
exist alongside very backward firms – distributions of firms by productivity have long and fat 
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tails and distorted firm dynamics. An important challenge for industrial policy in these 
economies is to compress the distribution of firms in terms of distance to frontier by closing 
down- or up-grading slacking firms and transferring resources from uncompetitive sectors. 
Of course, up-grading leader firms (shifting from imitation/adaptation to innovation) is also 
necessary.  
 
The implications of the Neo-Schumpeterian approach for industrial policy in emerging 
economies off the world technology frontier are that (i) increased competition is not 
necessarily positive for productivity growth as it might undermine the incentives to 
innovate; (ii) coordination has a high premium as it helps achieve economies of scale which 
is important for these countries to be competitive; (iii) financial mobilization is likely to 
happen through banks rather than financial markets; (iv) while education is important at all 
stages of development, secondary and tertiary education are particularly important off the 
frontier (while post-graduate education may actually be a waste of resources); (v) 
protection of intellectual property, openness and competition are complements and as such 
more important at the frontier; (vi) similarly, entry barriers and corruption are more 
important the closer an economy is to the frontier (this is, of course, not meant to condone 
corrupt practices – corruption is always bad – but it matters more as an economy 
approaches the frontier); (vii) technology transfers should be a focus (but technology must 
be appropriate, in the sense that it contributes to productivity improvements); (viii) 
management skills are very important  (Bloom and van Reenen, 2006); and (ix) strong 
efforts should be made to reallocate factors of production, across firms and industries, to 
more productive uses.  The levers can be activated both directly and also indirectly through 
by reducing corruption, relaxing credit constraints and improving education quality.  
 
As an economy reaches the world technology frontier the importance of competition and its 
complements increases and the emphasis shifts from imitation and adaptation within 
existing firms to innovation through the entry and exit of firms. Financial markets gain in 
importance relative to banks in the financing of innovation, and tertiary and post-graduate 
education become more important.   
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A core contribution of the Neo-Schumpeterian framework to the discussion of industrial 
policy is the conceptualization of the “Middle Income Trap” around the “switching point” 
from an industrial policy optimal away from the frontier to one that is suited for when an 
economy is close to or on the frontier. There could be many forces frustrating this switch. 
The most commonly discussed is one associated with special interests and political economy 
where incumbents and insiders block the emergence of institutions necessary to support a 
frontier industrial policy or just outright block the decisions associated with the switch itself.  
But there could also be rigidities in, for example, human capital formation or financing 
arrangements, that make switching more difficult. An industrial policy must take the 
existence of a switching point into account and incorporate features that would help 
facilitate this transition. In other words, some specific policies may be needed as an 
economy approaches the switching point so as to increase the likelihood of the switch.  
 
3. Industrial policy and state capacity 
 
An important critical consideration in assessing what type of industrial policy a particular 
economy could and should pursue is its ability to implement and enforce specific policies. 
Does it have sufficient checks and balances in order to prevent policies from being captured 
by special interests? We need some concept of state capacity, i.e., the institutional 
capability of a particular entity to carry out policies that deliver benefits and services to 
households and firms (Besley and Persson, 2010). Different industrial policies place different 
demands on state capacity, and some aspects of a particular industrial policy are likely to be 
more demanding than others. Different industrial policies depend on different aspects of 
the institutional environment. This complementarity between the institutional context and 
policies is important throughout the development process, but which aspects should 
reinforce each other is likely to differ from one development phase to another. 
 
In order to assess the capacity of countries to implement particular industrial policies we 
need a more granular description of state capacity and what determines this capacity. 
Fortunately, we have a relatively recent natural experiment with a number of countries 
transitioning from middle income to high income at approximately the same time, i.e., the 
EU accession process in Central and Eastern Europe. Bruszt and Campos (2016) looks at the 
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yearly assessments by the European Commission of these countries to understand the 
interaction between various aspects of state capacity and the sequencing of institutional 
development. They identify three aspects of state capacity: the judiciary, the bureaucracy 
and competition policy. Under each of these they distinguish between independence and 
capacity, and then look at the interrelationship between the different elements. Using 
lagged variables they also look at the sequencing of institutional development and suggest 
that judicial capacity and ultimately judicial independence, i.e., the establishment of a 
constitutional supreme court, are essential to bureaucratic capacity and the enforcement of 
competition policy. They demonstrate an intricate relationship between bureaucratic 
independence and judiciary capacity in unleashing a virtuous spiral of institutional change. 
Taking the findings of Bruszt and Campos to industrial policy the implication is that even in 
order for horizontal policies, like the enforcement of competition, a certain bureaucratic 
independence and judicial capacity are necessary, and they in turn trace back to judicial 
independence. Industrial policies that demand more from state capacity will require even 
more independence from the bureaucracy and the capacity of the judiciary. The strong 
suggestion is that more demanding industrial policies may not be feasible until later stages 
of institutional development when state capacity is greater. 
 
4. Industrial policy in practice 
 
There are many ideas in circulation for how the state can support structural transformation, 
transcending the traditional distinction between the universally embraced horizontal 
policies and the more controversial vertical policies. There are a number of intermediate 
approaches which could be characterised as sectoral-based horizontal policies, e.g., 
supporting human capital improvements, financing conditions and innovation in a particular 
industry, but also at so-called “smart specialisation” encouraging traditional industries as 
agricultural and textile manufacturing to invest in ICT or biochemistry. An important related 
strategy start from the observation of the growing importance and fragmentation of global 
value chains and how industrial policy can be used to facilitate the entry of firms into these 
global chains (Baldwin, 2016). Once the focus is on benefitting from being part of these 
global production systems broad sector-based policies may be less effective as only part of 
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the value chain will be based in a particular country. Instead the emphasis should be on 
attracting those parts of the value chains which have high (positive) spillovers, possibly to 
attract other value chains.  
 
The most ambitious industrial policy seriously discussed is probably that of the 
“entrepreneurial state” (Mazzucato, 2015). This approach sees the state as a mission-
oriented “venture capitalist” taking important risk in individual sectors and firms, and using 
a portfolio approach to diversify that risk, while trying to retain level playing field in 
individual sectors. The model has perhaps most clearly been expressed in various US 
government-sponsored innovation schemes, but another example is the Israeli state-
sponsored Yozma programme which launched an eventually very successful venture capital 
industry, now essentially privately owned. The state would set the direction of travel of 
individual industries and provide road maps, preferably through sector dialogues. One 
important aspect stressed by the proponents of this approach is the need to improve 
assessment tools and encourage evidence-based learning so as to facilitate structural 
transformation. Under this approach the state has a role in developing markets, e.g., feed-in 
tariffs in order to allow the market for renewable energy to develop.  
 
The “entrepreneurial state” would also crowd in private capital, particularly institutional 
capital, to mitigate coordination failures achieve critical scale (see, for example, the BNDS 
development bank in Brazil). Needless to say, this form of industrial policy is easily captured 
and as such very demanding on institutions and sensitive to political risk (as seen, for 
example, in the renewable energy industry, both in emerging and advanced economies).  
The potential and the risks involved in such ambitious industrial policy are illustrated by the 
two US examples of Tesla – at least until recently regarded as a great success – and Solyndra 
which became a huge embarrassment for the Obama administration when it failed.  
 
Needless to say, the “entrepreneurial state” approach to industrial policy is very demanding 
on state institutions, requiring in-depth understanding of technologies and the context in 
which they are applied. At best, only very advanced economies with strong institutions can 
be expected to manage the downside risks of this approach. But there are also concerns 
that even emerging economies, where industrial policies are focusing on imitation and 
8 
 
adaptation, the demands on state capacity may be too high given the development of their 
institutions. We have the paradox of industrial policy, i.e., where industrial policy is most 
straightforward the institutions are the weakest. Next, we proceed to discuss the ambitions 
of the European Union in terms of industrial policies and whether its institutions are 
compatible. 
 
5. EU industrial policy 
The EU has had an official industrial policy for many years. The so-called “Europe 2020 — A 
Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth” (COM(2010) 2020) brought together 
four flagship initiatives dealing with industrial policy: “Innovation Union” (COM(2010) 0546); 
“A digital agenda for Europe” COM(2010) 2020 (COM(2010) 0245); “An industrial policy for 
the globalisation era” (COM(2010) 0614) and “New Skills for New Jobs” (COM(2008) 0868). 
The European Council Communication from January 2014 says that “EU Industrial 
policy aims to stimulate growth and competitiveness in the manufacturing sector and 
the EU economy as a whole…Industrial policy is horizontal in nature…well integrated into a 
number of other EU policies such as those relating to trade, the internal market, research 
and innovation, employment, environmental protection and public health”. The objectives 
are further spelled out in a document entitled “For a European Industrial Renaissance” 
(SWD(2014) 14 final) which suggests that industrial policy aims at (i) speeding up 
adjustment of industry to structural changes; (ii) encouraging an environment favourable to 
initiative…throughout the Union, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings; (iii) 
encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings; and (iv) 
fostering better exploitation of industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and 
technological development. 
These documents suggest that the European Union has ambitious objectives in the area of 
industrial policy, but the policies advocated are “horizontal in nature” and mainly aim to 
infuse other policy areas with the same horizontal thinking. However, in climate space the 
level of ambition has been higher with the establishment of the EU Emissions Trading 
System in 2005 in order to meet the EU obligations under the Kyoto Accord. The creation of 
the European Research Council was another key initiative fostering research quality and 
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ultimately state-of-the-art innovation. However, proceeding further down the path towards 
the “entrepreneurial state” will be a challenge, given the weakness of the institutions at the 
European level and the limited support from member state governments and populations 
for strengthening these institutions.  
Despite this realism about the prospects for industrial policy in general at the EU level, there 
are a number of important areas where specific sector policies are having a strong impact 
and will probably become even more important. Green Growth horizontal policies are 
critical to capture the upside of climate policy (regulation, supervision, funding schemes, 
trading mechanisms etc.). Here the EU has played an increasingly important role and is also 
likely to do so in the future. Another example is the Capital Market Union which is still in its 
infancy, but could help scale back the over-sized European banking sector, strengthen 
financial markets and encourage bankruptcy reform. The European Union also has potential 
to strengthen its capacity for development finance, particularly in the areas of infrastructure 
and SME finance. The Juncker Plan represented a step in this direction, but institutional 
innovation is needed to crowd in institutional capital into this space. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The Neo-Schumpeterian framework combined with the literature on state capacity has 
helped us understand the actual and potential roles of industrial policy in different contexts. 
In particular, the Neo-Schumpeterian sheds light on the differences in the desirable policies 
when an economy, an industry or a firm is at the world technology frontier and when it is far 
from that frontier. But the literature on state capacity also suggests that what are the 
appropriate policies depends on what the institutions can handle. We spoke of the “paradox 
of industrial policy” – where industrial policy seems most palatable and justified, i.e., when 
economies are imitating and adapting existing technologies, institutions tend to be the 
weakest. Very importantly, state capacity is tested around the point where it is optimal to 
switch from one set of policies to another. This switching point is the key to understanding 
how to avoid getting stuck with inappropriate institutions and policies – what we have 
defined as the Middle Income Trap. Fortunately, most of the new EU member states have by 
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now managed the transition from middle to high income without getting stuck in the 
“Middle Income Trap”.  
Much of this structural transformation was achieved during the EU accession process. We 
saw that more ambitious industrial policies can be become feasible through the 
strengthening of state capacity. The work of Bruszt and Campos show that building 
bureaucratic capacity is core, but judicial capacity is also important for the enforcement of, 
for example, competition policy. The analysis also pointed to areas where resources should 
be focused in order to strengthen both judicial and bureaucratic capacity at the national 
level as well as the level of the EU. Yet, these previously so successful measures have lost 
much of their powers as these countries have become full members (they are still having an 
impact in the countries aspiring to EU accession in Southeast Europe and to some extent in 
countries like Ukraine where the dream of a closer relationship to the EU plays an important 
role in domestic politics). Identifying new “outside anchors” promoting further reform, or 
stopping reform reversals, would be important. The much discussed Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the European Union could have served 
as such an anchor, but this agreement now looks highly unlikely to become reality in the 
near future. 
In taking our conceptual framework to the European growth challenge we found that 
Europe really has needed two types of industrial policies – one for the countries at the 
world technology frontier and another for the countries away from the frontier, mainly in 
Central and Eastern Europe and Southern Europe. As these economies converge industrial 
policy should now increasingly focus on service-sector jobs related to industry and in 
attracting the parts of the global value chains with the greatest positive spillovers. 
Governments should strengthen their capacity to benefit from these spillovers, e.g., through 
raising the level of human capital, in particular through tertiary and post-graduate 
education. Cities are at the core of these strategies as they tend to agglomerate important 
skills. In the parts of Europe that still finds itself further away from the frontier policies 
should focus on technology transfers which is likely to be easier when only parts of the 
value chains are involved. The emphasis in these parts of Europe should be on benefitting as 
much as possible from the spillovers from these knowledge flows. Both sets of countries 
need social policies that match these industrial policies and help societies adapt to 
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structural change. Schemes are also necessary to help adjustment in more remote cities and 
rural areas as central cities, particularly cosmopolitan mega-cities, will prosper under the 
new forms of globalisation. 
Industrial policies as the EU level have had some success, such as the efforts to pool 
resources for R&D, e.g., through establishment of the European Research Council and the 
various framework programmes for research. But the challenge for EU level industrial policy 
has been that while European institutions potentially could have played a more important 
role in facilitating spillovers within and among advanced economies and encouraging 
technology transfers from advanced to emerging parts of the continent, they really were not 
set up to differentiate policies between advanced and emerging economies. Moreover, 
there was little agreement among member states on industrial policy objectives. Going 
forward there may be more convergence of views on policies to attract parts of value chains 
with high spillovers and facilitating the flow of knowledge within Europe.   
However, there is less likely to be agreement at the European level on firm-specific vertical 
policies, and even more so something like the “Entrepreneurial State” approach. These 
policies are more susceptible to capture by special interests and more vulnerable to political 
risk and other forms of uncertainty. Not many EU member states, let alone European voters, 
would be comfortable with the European institutions playing this kind of activist role in 
general. Yet, in certain areas EU-level industrial policy has been more ambitious, particularly 
in the area of green technology and potentially in capital markets, but policies have 
primarily been horizontal. Sector-specific horizontal policies are less demanding on 
institutions, and probably more palatable from a political point of view, but industrial policy 
is shifting away from sectors to technologies, often proprietary to individual corporations. 
Investment in specific global value chains could also become obsolete over time and smart 
specialization bringing new technologies to traditional industries easily become too 
domestic not exploiting potential spillovers across countries. 
The long-term prospects for European industrial policy will depend on how global value 
chains and associated trade and investment patterns will continue to evolve. There is a view 
that as technologies allow for tailored production closer to markets (e.g., 3D printing), 
robots increasingly replace blue- and white-collar workers, and the relative importance of 
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costs of transport increase manufacturing may be moved back “on shore”. The uncovering 
of new energy supplies, particularly shale oil and gas in the US, but also the falling costs of 
renewables, could also affect the location of different parts of the global value chains. Even 
if all these trends suggests some revival of manufacturing in the advanced economies of 
Europe, including a “re-shoring” to Central and Eastern Europe, the overwhelming trend will 
be for emerging economies outside Europe to rise and permanently shift the balance in the 
global economy. European industrial policies at the national level as well as the EU level 
must aim to allow European firms and consumers to benefit as much as possible from this 
global structural transformation. 
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